

1.3(a)(4)

6-37

13 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD :

SUBJECT : Assessment of [REDACTED]

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1. This afternoon Mr. Helms called a meeting of Messrs. Timm, Angleton, and me to consider the [REDACTED] evaluation of [REDACTED] which we received today.

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2. We began by showing Mr. Angleton the Berlin report, about which he expressed skepticism. Mr. Helms said he thought we had to be very cautious about "going bail" for any material of such a controversial and significant nature. He said he did not subscribe to the British statement that [REDACTED] bona fides were clearly established "beyond any reasonable doubt". Mr. Timm expressed similar views.

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3. I said that I agreed we should not go quite as far as the British had gone, but that deception up to now was virtually out of the question. I said the main danger, as I saw it, was that at some point in time, which we could not identify, [REDACTED] might be apprehended and played back, as [REDACTED] was.

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4. Mr. Helms said that one of his main concerns was [REDACTED] personal bias and the possible danger of his "overreading" things he picked up through hearsay.

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5. In conclusion, it was agreed that we would advise Mr. Wisner that we did not go quite as far as the British in accepting [REDACTED] at face value but had every confidence in him.

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6. Later in the day, Mr. Helms, Angleton, and I went to the Director's office to discuss the [REDACTED] matter. While we were waiting, we again reviewed the assessment we had made of [REDACTED] and I showed Mr. Angleton, for the first time, the "source comment" on our dissemination and asked him, in view of his suspicion of deception, how he thought this might serve Soviet purposes. After reading the source comment, he confessed that he could see no way in which it would be to the Soviet interest to give us this line. However, Angleton then took off on the notion that [REDACTED] was an anarchist or a crank and for some obscure reason was trying to get us in war with the Russians. I frankly do not know what Angleton was talking about

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
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in this regard and doubt very much that he did.

7. Mr. Angleton left before the Director arrived back from the White House, but Mr. Helms and I reviewed with the Director the British assessment and Wisner's request to brief Ambassador Bruce. The Director agreed that our assessment should be a bit more cautious than the British assessment and authorized us to instruct Wisner to brief Bruce.

  
JOHN M. MAURY  
Chief, SR Division

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